The appellant was a spray painter by occupation and, in May 1995, he obtained cover for work-related personal Injuries, In particular solvent neurotoxicity and occupational asthma. He was subsequently Identified as having multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome.
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The appellant was accepted as being incapacitated from his pre-Injury employment and began receiving weekly compensation.
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From October 2000 until July 2004 the appellant was engaged In various forms of employment as a driver and a labourer, for which he received remuneration.
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The appellant failed to disclose this post-Injury employment and continued to receive the full amount of weekly compensation during that period.
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The appellant was subsequently prosecuted by ACC on 15 charges of . using a document for pecuniary advantage, to which he pleaded guilty
the problem is ACC had no right to cancel ERC but could only carry out an abatement of earnings calculation.
ERC is reinstated and ACC must do the calculation.
...[17] It is also the case, I find, that the appellant has continued to have a weekly compensation entitlement despite the fact of his conviction and, if that entitlement has been stopped, then It has been so without proper process and I direct that any calculation of any sum claimed to be owing by the appellant to the respondent must take account of the appellant's ongoing weekly compensation entitlement, measured again by any ongoing income that he may have received from employment In the period.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
HELD AT DUNEDIN
Decision No: 210/2007
UNDER The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001
IN THE MATTER of an appeal pursuant to s 149 of the Act
BETWEEN BARRIE MARK BURNETT
(AI 452/06)
Appellant
AND ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent
HEARING at DUNEDIN on 9 August 2007
APPEARANCES/COUNSEL
Mr P Sara for Appellant
Mr I Hunt for Respondent
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF JUDGE M J BEATTIE
Introduction
[1] The issue in this appeal concerns the correctness of the respondent's decision of 1 December 2005 whereby it recorded an outstanding debt of $87,665.82 as being owing by the appellant, and requiring him to make repayment of same.
[2] In this case, the appellant, through counsel, Is challenging the basis of the debt claimed, that is challenging the amount of the overpayment said to have been made. In making that challenge, counsel is not contending that there may be no sum due to the respondent but, rather, the calculation of any overpayment has not been carried out on the statutory principles applicable under the Act.
[3] The background facts are not In dispute and may be stated as follows:
• The appellant was a spray painter by occupation and, in May 1995, he obtained cover for work-related personal Injuries, In particular solvent neurotoxicity and occupational asthma. He was subsequently Identified as having multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome.
• The appellant was accepted as being incapacitated from his pre-Injury employment and began receiving weekly compensation.
• From October 2000 until July 2004 the appellant was engaged In various forms of employment as a driver and a laborer, for which he received remuneration.
• The appellant failed to disclose this post-Injury employment and continued to receive the full amount of weekly compensation during that period.
• The appellant was subsequently prosecuted by ACC on 15 charges of . using a document for pecuniary advantage, to which he pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced on 2 September 2005.
• The appellant was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, with leave to apply for home detention. No order for reparation was made.
• The amount of weekly compensation paid to the appellant during the period covered by his fraudulent actions was $87,665.82.
• . Subsequent to the appellant being sentenced for fraud, the respondent issued its decision of 1 December 2005 establishing a debt of $87,665.82 and requiring repayment of same.
• The appellant sought a review of that decision. Rather than considering whether the debt sought to be recovered was properly constituted, the Reviewer concentrated on the provisions of s 251(2) of the Act, which might be described as the "equitable remission of debt provision", and which, not unsurprlslngly, the Reviewer found not to apply on the facts of the case.
[4] The Court received extensive written and oral submissions from counsel for the parties in this appeal but, having considered those submissions, I find the matter to be fairly straightforward and simple. In addition to the background facts set out above, I find the following facts to be established:
(i)The respondent has made no determination that the appellant was no longer incapacitated, In accordance with s 104 of the Act.
(ii)The respondent has made no determination of the appellant having attained vocational independence, pursuant to s 107 of the Act.
(iii)The amount of the debt sought to be recovered represents the net amount of weekly compensation paid to the appellant between 20 October 2000 and 18 July 2004 without any abatement of compensation assessment carried out in accordance with the formula provided in cl 51 of Schedule 1 to the Act.
[5] Mr Hunt, for the respondent, referred to a number of medical reports from occupational medicine specialists which indicated that the appellant was capable of full-time employment providing he wasn't exposed to particular solvents In any workplace he may be engaged In. Further, counsel Indicated that the very fact of the appellant's employment would indicate his capabilities.
[6] Mr Hunt's submission was wholly based on the premise that the evidence entitled the respondent to find that the appellant was not incapacitated during the relevant period, i.e. between October 2000 and July 2004, and therefore there was no entitlement to weekly compensation for that period; therefore the whole of the amount was recoverable.
[7] Mr Sara, on the other hand, submitted that the respondent had made no determination of the appellant as no longer being Incapacitated and, secondly, that the respondent had not had reference to any abatement principles when assessing the amount of overpayment.
Decision
[8] The respondent contends, by the decision It made which is now the subject of this appeal, that it is entitled to have repaid to it the full amount of weekly compensation paid to the appellant between October 2000 and July 2004, being the period when It contends the appellant was engaged in remunerative employment and, therefore, ought not to have been receiving weekly compensation.
[9] In support of that contention, Mr Hunt has referred the Court to evidence that was presented at the prosecution of the appellant, which clearly Identified that he was engaged In remunerative employment In that period; and, secondly, counsel has referred to the opinion of Professor Des Gorman, Occupational Medicine Specialist, who considers that the appellant is fit to rejoin the workforce in occupations that do not Involve exposure to solvents. Counsel also referred to the fact that Professor Gorman considered that the appellant could return to his former employment providing there was a proper spray painting booth and there was proper personal protective equipment provided by the employer.
[10] Those medical reports have gone no further than being reports and have never been acted upon by the respondent either in terms of making a determination under s104 that the appellant is no longer incapacitated or by it initiating vocational independence assessment in accordance with s107 of the Act.
[11] Without either of those two procedures being implemented and decisions made, I find, as a matter of law, that the appellant must be taken as still being incapacitated within the meaning of the Act and thereby prima facie entitled to receive the weekly compensation that was assessed as being his entitlement back in 1995.
[12] The fact that the appellant has been engaged in remunerative employment I find, as a matter of law, only affects the amount of the weekly compensation to which the appellant is entitled. The situation of a claimant In receipt of weekly compensation receiving earnings during that same period is specifically provided for in cls 49 and 51 of Schedule 1 to the Act and it Is the case that the respondent can abate the amount of weekly compensation payable In accordance with the formula provided for in cl 51 of Schedule 1 to the Act.
[13] The respondent has not carried out such an exercise and, therefore, prima facie the amount which it seeks to recover, and which is the subject of the decision under appeal, must be considered questionable and it could not be considered the correct amount unless the appropriate calculation, using the abatement formula, was made.
[14] The fact that the appellant committed criminal offences In the course of continuing to receive weekly compensation, I find Is wholly Irrelevant to the Issue in this appeal. The offence committed by the appellant, which he acknowledged, was that he knowingly failed to advise the respondent of his income at the time he signed the various ARC 18's on which he declared that he was not receiving any remuneration.
[15] The criminal act, and the appellant's acknowledgement of it, does not in any way impinge upon what might be his ultimate liability under Accident Compensation legislation.
[16] In summary, therefore, I find that the respondent's decision of 1 December 2005 cannot be sustained and it is hereby quashed. The quashing of that decision does not mean that the appellant does not have any obligation of repayment to the respondent for any amount of weekly compensation paid to him In the period October 2000 to July 2004, it simply means that the way in which that sum was calculated was not in accordance with the requirements of the Act, and any sum due by the appellant to the respondent can only be the amount calculated after applying the abatement principles contained In the Act.
[17] It is also the case, I find, that the appellant has continued to have a weekly compensation entitlement despite the fact of his conviction and, if that entitlement has been stopped, then It has been so without proper process and I direct that any calculation of any sum claimed to be owing by the appellant to the respondent must take account of the appellant's ongoing weekly compensation entitlement, measured again by any ongoing income that he may have received from employment In the period.
[18] The appellant being successful, I allow costs in the sum of $2,000.
Dated this 4th day of September 2007
M J Beattie
District Court Judge
Attached File(s)
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Burnett_v_ACC_452_06.pdf (126.94K)
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